The Madness of 2001, Change of Mission, and Finally, I Focus on Zambia.

The rain has come and has it come. Rain every day for a week and forecast for another two. As an ex-farmer, nearly time to say when will this bloody rain stop despite a preceding dry four months.

An active week. A visit to see good friends in the Algarve and a heart-stopping experience, which reset my heart to a regular rhythm for now. I will write about the Algarve trip this weekend in a short blog as on Tuesday next week I go in for surgery to try and alleviate my incontinence. As for the heart procedure, it went well, and I left the hospital with no arrhythmia, although previously it had come back. And it has rained, boy has it rained, right in the middle of the olive harvest, which is excellent this year, with some saying the best yields ever. Interestingly, the expressors raised their prices. Like many traditional country services, due to complex rules and bureaucracy in the EU, only large operators can survive implementation, creating monopolies.

The writing for the majority of us commercial farmers was on the wall by 2001; there was little doubt that we would inevitably lose our farms unless there was divine intervention in the form of political change or serious action by the British. The former, while the will of the people had been demonstrated as wanting change, was to have proven to be a dream too far. Sure, target sanctions were brought in due to the people having their vote stolen but in the meantime, many states, including the African Union, were happy to continue to recognise Mugabe and his cronies as our rightful political leaders. After all, most African leaders had not attained their positions through legitimate electoral processes, or at least not through elections free from manipulation or interference. The golden rule in African politics is if you get into office (position of power), make sure you never get out without using everything within your control, including the ‘hard’ state apparatus, to remain. This includes the police, army and prisons. In Zimbabwe, this was easy as all these state structures, including the civil service, were there through the patronage of the party, ZANU(PF). Every tool of intimidation must be brought into play especially in this case; the ruling party thugs were treated as one of their own and therefore able to operate with immunity despite their acts of bloodshed, either as a tool of intimidation against the opposition or by that time for the expedient removal of farmers and their workers from the land. Many farmers had previously received letters of ‘no present interest’ from the state, which was meant to enable the sale and purchase of land without fear of confiscation by the state; legally, that is. What was happening in Zimbabwe in 2001 was totally illegal. Perhaps we needed a Trump back then; at least he knows how necessary property rights are, unlike Blair and Co.

“I was bitter enough about losing my farms, but I often wondered about the many farmers of British birth or their descendants who were veterans settled by the British government following the Second World War. They fought in defending the home nation, Britain, but now in their time of personal need, that nation, to all intents and purposes, disowned any obligation to them.” - Peter McSporran

No wonder they were both bitter and confused. I do feel bitter now in my old age when I reflect on it, but back in 2001, there was no time for bitterness. Many tried to put up a valiant fight for their land, even winning in court. However, some, finding the courts' rulings worthless, resorted to making arrangements or strong arguments and appeals to senior politicians and the security leadership for help. All this did was stimulate a huge host of chancers offering assistance for cash. In desperation, many initially paid, as it was, it turned out for nothing. The leadership of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) was isolated by the regime's cleverness, which simply stated they did not want to talk to them as they were hardliners, despite the farmers only advocating for their legal rights and the restoration of the rule of law. Unwittingly or wittingly, those who were lured by the Government to be its emissaries, such as John Bredenkamp and others, into advocating the softer stance actually undermined the strength of the CFU and its elected leadership. How true was the old adage ‘Divide and Conquer’ to be once again proven correct? However, the substantive compromise required was never really forthcoming from the state, rather it was a proposal from these emissaries that they thought the Government would accept. I personally do not think so, even on reflection. It definitely helped to undermine both the legitimacy of the CFU and their arguments and pleas to the international community, further dividing the farmers in their ongoing search for the compensation they are legally due under Zimbabwe and international law. 

John Bredenkamp, admired by some, despised by others. Hero during his Rhodesian sanction-breaking, but not so as an arms dealer and mine owner in the DRC

“By Bredenkamp openly advocating this position, compromise, he himself undermined his own proposal and the people who presented it on his behalf, due to a general distrust of the man and his reputation for being close to Mugabe. Was it a planned tactic by him or the intelligence organisations to ensure all parties that seemed to be representing the farmers were compromised? Food for thought.” - Peter McSporran

It can be summed up as causing such confusion that there was no united front to counter events. In saying that, there was probably no chance anyway, but the long-term effect of these early actions still haunts us today in our endeavours for compensation, both for land and improvements. The split came into the open when it was said that an extraordinary general meeting would be held in March 2001, where Nick Swanepoel, the openly declared spokesperson (leader?) of this faction, would present a proposal prepared by himself and Bredenkamp, where the farmers would be expected to give up a third of their land, along with other concessions. The content as reported in the British Sunday Times newspaper read as:

“The CFU would change its name and would be led by a black commercial farmer. The new-look union would immediately begin to resettle 20,000 communal farmers on 100,000 hectares of land, with the support of white farmers. The white farmers were expected to plough, donate seed and other services. In return, the war veterans and other supporters would withdraw from hundreds of farms that had been occupied, often violently. In terms of the deal, allegedly drawn up by Bredenkamp and Swanepoel, all legal cases against the war veterans would be dropped.”

Nick even took out an advertisement in the local press advocating the dismissal of the then President of the CFU, Tim Henwood, and his council. To most farmers, it was evident that such a proposal was unworkable, and many recognised it as a tool of disruption among the farmers and those who represented them. These were just words, not a workable solution. It opened up multiple questions, “How? Who? Where?” Never mind where the funding would come from and who would have oversight of the implementation of such a complicated proposal. Despite what I believe was an unworkable proposal, surprisingly, Greg Brackenridge, Chairman of the Bankers Association, came out in support of it. I suppose he hoped to recover some of the farmers’ debt, but his involvement was just another added red herring in the mix. The proposal was rejected; I am not sure if it was even presented, but the CFU said it was happy to talk to the Government, and Nick was asked to be part of the team, a conduit, so to speak, to help in discussions. It was all in vain, and Tim Henwood left the CFU at the next congress, and Colin Cloete, funnily enough an ex-Selous Scout, took over but contrary to expectations took a very compromising stance with Government as farmers and their workers continued to suffer murders, beatings, humiliations, months of sleepless nights with invaders banging drums and yelling at their doors, with interference in their operations and finally if rushing to save a neighbour; imprisonment, an added tool of the state. 

There are many reports and papers written about these events. One that is a good record is by Angus Selby which can be found on this link. https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_docs/qehwps143.pdf

As I said previously, I was convinced this madness would not stop despite the consequences to the country. 

“Zimbabwe had become even moreso a country ruled by people who felt they did not need the support of its people, just its subservience." - Peter McSporran

The idea of finding consultancy work had faded, but the lessons learned during my two years of searching opened my eyes to what was required, and I would keep this in good standing for my future. I am one who does not always agree with those who say you learn from your failures, only if you know the reason why. Identifying that is not always an easy trick.

Colonial Vila Pery in the late sixties

I took off to Mozambique once again in about mid-2001, this time with Alan McGregor from the Vumba at the wheel of his Land Cruiser, accompanied by Vernon Nicolle and Graham Rae. The plan was to take a much closer look at the available land, including trips south to Sussendenga and as far north as Catindica, to see if it would be suitable for seed production. Both areas, including Vanduzi, where Graham had played war during the struggle for independence, had excellent soils and good water resources. The access roads were reasonable, but there was no power, and at that time Graham, Vernon and I were thinking of seed maize production; winter rains looked like a problem. Alan saw an opportunity for burley tobacco, which he grew in the Burma Valley, and eventually he would go into partnership with Ox Hacking and Kevin Gifford in Vanduzi on a derelict dairy project, which must have cost millions, but no longer supported one cow. In later years I would help Kevin through AgDevCo set up a seed business on the very same farm. Small world! I, as a Virginia tobacco farmer, considered the area too mild and moist to grow high-yielding Virginia (flue-cured) tobacco, a view reinforced by Malcolm Clyde-Wiggins and John Meikle, who were growing good-quality burley there but said they were unable to achieve viable yields with the available varieties.

Chimioi(ex Vila Pery), twenty-five years after independence. Planning is obviously a thing of the past.

On returning home, after a heavy night at Mutare Club, I decided to focus my attention on Zambia, following earlier visits where I had struck up a relationship with the country's Vice President, Enoch P. Kavindele, who strongly advocated for us to consider Zambia.

Disclaimer: Copyright Peter McSporran. The content in this blog represents my personal views and does not reflect corporate entities.